Sidama’s Long Campaign for Statehood: Where are we now? What are Future Priorities?

By Sidama Crisis Monitor

April 2024

Background

The Sidama nation, one of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic groups, is known for their indigenous democratic governance system known as ‘Motte’. However, conquerors from the Abyssinian highlands incorporated Sidama territories into Ethiopia in the early 1890s. For many decades since then it existed as part of a multi-ethnic province named ’”Sidamo”. Under a succession of emperors headquartered in Addis Ababa, the Sidamas felt socially-, economically-, and politically-marginalized for more than a century and consistently demanded ethno-cultural justice and equality expressed in a lot of different ways. Notably, the Sidamas rebelled under the Marxist Derg, which ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 and – like its predecessors – also ran a unitary nation state. The armed struggle against Derg by various national liberation fronts, such as the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), played a key role in the 1991 revolution, which transformed the country from Marxist-Leninist military dictatorship into a multi-national federation [1].

Following the collapse of Derg in 1991, the Tigray People Libration Front (TPLF) -led coalition known as EPRDF who came to power promised to decentralize power. The new constitution introduced a system that aims to protect the rights of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups and prevent the return of the oppressive rule from the center they had endured for far too long [2]. The constitution allowed for self-rule in nine regional states, plus the federal capital, Addis Ababa. It even went a step further and included a provision for self-determination for nations, nationalities, and peoples including secession by regions as independent nation-states [3]. After consolidating its power, the ruling coalition controlled by the Tigrayan minority elites suppressed autonomy demands. It kept regional state governments under complete control through its proxy four regional coalition member parties as well as other closely affiliated parties that run the five other regions [4].

In the south, the EPRDF’s decision to bundle 56 different ethnic groups into one regional state called the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNPPR) after a brief transitional period fuelled discontent, primarily among the Sidama. Ethiopia’s constitution granted some ethnic groups that were far smaller than the population of the Sidama [5], allowing them to choose a working language and other things like levying some taxes and legislate in areas such as education and land administration. In this sense, the merger of the 56 different ethnic groups in the south was inconsistent with the constitution and caused huge resentment among the Sidama [6].

Peaceful protests associated with Sidama’s statehood struggle periodically erupted in Hawassa and other places in the Sidama Zone. In 2002, more than 69 peaceful protesters were gunned down by security forces in broad daylight and hundreds more severely injured on Hawassa’s outskirts called Looqqe during demonstrations against measures aimed at moving the capital of Sidama Zone to a different place and making Hawassa directly accountable to the regional government [7-9]. Some 4 years later, then-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi bullied the Sidama Zone leaders to suspend their pursuit of a regional statehood after the Sidama zonal council voted for a referendum on statehood.

Since that time, Sidama’s campaign for statehood was weakened until 2018, when it gathered momentum as the EPRDF became increasingly weak, due to internal power struggle following the sudden death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and anti-government protests led by the frustrated youth, primarily in the Oromia region [10]. The Sidama held a series of grassroot consultations and petitions, with the majority of Sidama woreda or district assemblies voting in favour of a statehood referendum [11]. Following the assemblies’ vote, another vote took place at the zonal council level on 18 July 2018, which received the support of more than the constitutionally required two thirds of Sidama Zone legislators [12]. The vote by the Sidama zone legislators meant that the Ethiopian authorities (namely the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia; NEBE) had to organize a referendum within a year of the regional council receiving the zonal request – that is, by 18 July 2019 – and create a new regional state if a majority backs that option via referendum [13]. Ethiopian authorities were initially hell-bent to block the statehood demand by using delay and defeat tactics to frustrate the Sidama people. The Sidama people were united in rejecting the Ethiopian regime’s bullying tactics. And pro-democracy activists from the Ejjeetto movement were in no mood to accept further delays to forming a state for which they long campaigned and sacrificed for. This forced Prime Minister Abiy to appear in his rubber-stamp parliament on 1 July 2019 and declare that “There is no government that can compromise Ethiopian unity”. He said failure to follow correct procedure for declaring statehood could result in federal intervention [14]. [He vowed to crush any move to declare statehood in the same manner he dealt with the Somali Regional State]. As he promised to do so, Abiy dispatched his security forces in a bid to prevent the Sidama from self-declaring statehood and killed more than 153 Sidamas and injured many more in what has come to be known as the 11/11/11 (July 18, 2019) massacre.

After a rather long campaign and huge sacrifices, referendum was eventually held on 20 November 2019, with nearly 99% of the registered voters supporting formation of Sidama statehood. The referendum was historic in its own right because it was the first such electoral exercise in Ethiopia (and even in Africa) that was conducted to implement a vote on regional statehood. There were 1,692 polling stations, 2,280,147 registered voters, of whom 2,277,063 cast their votes, resulting in a 98.86 percent voter turnout [source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems]. On November 23, the NEBE announced results demonstrating that 98.5 percent of voters were in support of the Sidama national statehood [ International Foundation for Electoral Systems: https://www.ifes.org/news/ethiopia-holds-referendum-determine-statehood-sidama-zone].

Establishment of the Sidama Regional State and the Right to Self-Rule

The Sidama National Regional State was officially admitted as the 10th State of FDRE on June 20, 2020. Nevertheless, Sidama’s right to self rule enshrined in the constitution was violated by the Prime Minister who directly appointed the new leaders of the state. This was a deliberate political interference to exact revenge on the Sidama nation for their relentless campaign to secure regional statehood. As the prime minister vowed to render the new regional state a failed state, he selected those cadres who were not only the least capable to govern the new state but have worked to stifle the campaign for statehood with the now defunct South Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM). As a result, the Sidama Regional State remained a failed regional state to date.

State of governance and challenges

Corruption and nepotism: Corruption is rife in Sidama. The meager budget subsidy allocated for the region is openly looted by pp cadres at all levels of the administration. Corruption is particularly widespread at the regional and district levels. This is expected since the cadress appointed by Abiy Ahmed as the top rulers of the region were previously indicted for corrupt practices during the EPRDF rule and removed from their posts. These cadres should have been tried in courts of law for their crimes of corruption during the previous regime and not be promoted to loot the region. Nepotism is widespread. Employment is primarily family based and to a great extent clan and locality based. There is no consideration for merit. This divisive nepotism has eroded the social fabric and unity of the Sidama society, as intended by the revenge project.

Massive poverty and unemployment: Due to bad governance, impacts of climate change and declining productivity in the agriculture sector emanating from a rapid population growth and subsistence farming practices, Sidama has faced severe food insecurity particularly in the past five years. Rural poverty has increased significantly pushing households to urban centres including Hawassa and Addis Ababa in search of livelihoods. These migrants either live in precarious conditions on the streets as beggars or survive on unsustainable petty activities. Such level of abject poverty amid lush green natural environment, reflects the total failure of governance. Youth unemployment has skyrocketed. Estimates indicate that youth unemployment and underemployment has reached over 70%. The same is true for graduate unemployment reflecting skills mismatch amid poor quality of education and anemic private sector development stifled by inimical business climate.

Appalling conditions of basic economic and social services: Economic and social services have collapsed due to lack of maintenance, upgrading and expansion of economic and social infrastructure such as roads, water and sanitation, electricity, ICT, schools, and health facilities, among others. Roads connecting district capitals built three decades ago have fallen apart due to lack of maintenance and upgrading. Less than 10% of all weather roads are tar marked undermining investment, trade and economic development and perpetuating poverty.

Grave violations of basic human rights: The administrators of the Sidama Regional State continues to grossly violate the basic rights of civilians. Citizens are imprisoned without any arrest warrants on daily basis in clear violations of fundamental human rights and their constitutional rights. Freedom of association and speech have been curtailed. A media network created by volunteer Sidama diaspora group has been hijacked and used as an instrument of the propaganda machine for the ruling party effectively silencing alternative voices in the region.

Deteriorating peace and security: The failed governance has risked peace and security in the region. At one point the regional state security bureau head, alemayehu timotewos debochi, attempted to create a state sponsored “liberation movement” in the spirit of gachana sirna in Oromia region to terrorize the Sidama civilians with impunity. Although his criminal enterprises were exposed and nipped in the bud, he and his partners in crime abraham marshallo and destaw ledamo instigated nearly a dozen conflicts with the neighboring Oromia region in which dozens of civilians were killed. The security of the Sidama nation has never been as precarious in the history of the nation.

Priority areas for intervention

Human rights of Sidama people are being violated at an alarming rate in what appears to be a revenge campaign by Abiy’s PP-led government. Police and security officials targeted real and perceived supporters of any opposition party. We know that Sidama Federalist Party (SFP — I think that is what it’s called) leaders and other pro-democracy groups are being hunted and attacked, detained, and disappeared. So many Sidamas are either in prison or fled their country, such as opposition party (Sidama Federalist Party) leaders including Tessema Elias Sho’le. Those who are detained are often held under inhuman conditions. Those who are lucky enough not to be arrested are usually given stern warnings to stop criticizing the ruling Prosperity Parity (PP) in any way, shape, or form — or else, face severe punishment.
Youth unemployment is skyrocketing.
In a very dangerous move, PP cadres spearheaded by Desta Ledamo (administrator of the SNR region) interfered with the management and day-to-day operation of the Sidama Media Network (which until recently was the one and only community media that served as the voice of the Sidama people).
We want to see an end to all of the above.

Lack of advocacy by those in the diaspora on behalf of their fellow Sidama back home seemed to give PP cadres confidence to misuse and abuse government power for suppressing dissent without any hesitation or thinking twice about any consequences for their reckless actions.
We need a platform to serve as facilitators of dialogue among the diaspora with the same shared common goal to find the middle ground between the differing views that are often voiced in the Diaspora and especially within the Sidama elites.

Outreach to faith-based Sidama groups, Sidama democracy advocates, Sidama youth-based associations, and media organizations – especially in the diaspora – is crucial. They can each be a representative voice of the Sidama people in Ethiopia – where most (if not all) of the people are silenced by Abiy’s authoritarian PP-led regime.
It is vital for those of us in the diaspora to speak against the vicious attack on our people by the PP regime in order to draw international attention towards what is happening in the SNR state, including calling on human rights groups to conduct impartial investigation into the above claims and hold perpetrators accountable.
Foster alliance with and outreach to other non-Sidama diaspora groups, such as those from the so-called Southern Region and Oromia, and of groups that represent the wide range of opinion and experience, including those who may not have visibility abroad but strong grassroots support in Ethiopia for their cause. Having a conversation on Ethiopia with these groups is vital in order to assist a country that is fragile right now to find its footing and get to an all-inclusive multicultural democracy that respects the rights of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups.
Regarding the last bullet point, I think that we need to discuss the criteria carefully. I think that we can try to engage with those groups that would be on the same page with us when it comes to issues that are dominant in the country such as the status of the constitution and the future of multinational federalism.

REFERENCES

1. Proclamation of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 1/1987, 12 September 1987.

2. Crisis Group Africa Report No. 153. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, 4 September 2009.

3. Proclamation of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1/1985, 21 August 1995.

4. Crisis Group Africa Report No. 269. Managing Ethiopia’s Unsettled Transition, 21 February 2019.

5. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National/Regional Self-Governments. Proclamation No. 7/1992, 14 January 1992.

6. Ethiopia Population and Housing Census, 2007.

7. Socio-Economic and Geo-Spatial Data Analysis and Dissemination Core Work Process: 2009 E.C Socio-Economic Profile, Hawassa City Administration, Finance and Economic Development Department, 2009.

Sidama Crisis Monitor