Sidama Crisis Monitor

By Sidama Crisis Monitor

April 2024

Introduction

The movement by the Ethiopian nations and nationalities began half a century ago between Italian occupation and the overthrow of Haile Selassie’s regime in 1974. The domination of absolute power in the state of Ethiopia backed by Amhara intellectuals was the hallmark of the Ethiopian history. The oppression of nations and nationalities began with the occupation of various nations in the south. Subsequently, Amharic was declared a national language although 85% of the population did not speak it. The Orthodox church was placed under the authority of the emperor as an ideology of the palace, despite most non-Amharans were not Orthodox. Moreover, the annexation of Eritrea by dissolving the federal administration was a clear indication of national oppression which unmasked Amhara’s domination and fuelled an armed struggle that culminated in Eritrea’s secession.

A Unitarist Pan-Ethiopian nationalism is an idealized form of national identity, which is promoted as a supra-ethnic identity that ethnic groups need to integrate into. On the other hand, ethno-nationalism perceives Ethiopianness as the sum of ethnic groups guaranteed through their participation. It is the manifestation of the new construct of Ethiopian identity “from below”, which would emerge from the “first” and “real” identities of Ethiopian peoples, i.e., their “ethnic” belonging (Bach, Citation 2014, p. 105)1. In contrast to the former, now it is possible to have double loyalty to the group and to the state i.e., Ethiopian national identity without losing one’s own ethnic identity. The ethnicity of other ethnic groups has centered on the discourse of “Amhara domination”, with roots going back to the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s and ultimately to the territorial expansions of Menelik and the birth of modern Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century.  A centralized absolutist state, where the imperial regime led by Amhara intellectuals and some assimilated to Amhara from neighboring nationalities replaced the traditional administrations, dislodged the local leadership from power, and increasingly concentrated power at the center, thereby triggering resistance with an ethnic dimension. The extraction of resources in the form of taxes to meet the growing budgetary needs for building a modern state structure was also an exacerbating factor to the grievances of nations and nationalities. 

Resistance against domination by unitary regimes

Resentment over the identity of local governance structures and the extortionist policies of the unitarist regime eventually led to multiple rebellions. The most prominent peasant uprisings against imperial rule were, the 1942 Tigrayan rebellion known as the “Weyane,” the 1960 Gedeo rebellion also called the “Michille war,” the beginning of the Eritrean secessionist movement in September 1960, the Bale rebellion in 1965, and the rebellion of peasants in Gojjam in 1968 (Gebru, Citation 1991)2. The underlying causes of these rebellions point to the key political problems of the imperial regime that ultimately led to its collapse in 1974 (Berhe & Gebresilassie, Citation 2021)3. All rebels (Tigray, Oromo, Gambella, Sidama, Ogaden, and afar and Eritrea) who fought for their rights were seen as separatists or narrow nationalists and anti-Ethiopianists.  These perceptions were created  by the Amhara ruling elites to undermine the struggle for the rights of nations and nationalities. As a result, many intellectuals who spearheaded the demands for the rights of oppressed nations to self determination  were accused and murdered as anti-Ethiopian elenents including Haile Feda, Baro Tumssa, Qesse Gudina Tumesa, etc. from Oromo, and Melese Tekle {Tigray). Liberals and socialists were certain for a long time about their expectation that ethnic and national identifications would wither away as the unification of the world was realized through international trade and mass communication (Hutchinson & Smith, Citation1996)4. However, as Connor (Citation1999) put it, ethno-national forces have been a political reality of most states in the world irrespective of geographic location, level of economic development, democratic culture, religion, and ideology (Connor, Citation1999)5. Ethno-national mobilization is a universal phenomenon of ethnic groups’ struggles with the state, claiming autonomy, representation, or fair socio-economic share (Kymlicka, Citation2006)6. Despite the presence of a few homogeneous states, equating the borders of political authority with national identity in the name of nation-state they remained more aspiration than reality (McGarry & Keating, Citation2006)7.

The Student movement and the right of nations to self determination

The Ethiopian Student Movement rejected the idea of Ethiopia as a nation, seeing it instead as made up of diverse cultures and semi-autonomous nations. Ethiopia, it was held, was a multinational state restrictively defined through the prism of Amhara cultural hegemony ( Wallelign M, 1969)8.  In his seminal 1969 article, Walelign condemned  national oppression in Imperial Ethiopia and argued that Ethiopia was not one nation, but rather an amalgamation of different nations and nationalities, whose struggle for self-determination should be supported”8.  This is the core issue in the struggle of Ethiopian nations and nationalities for self-rule. This line of thinking came to shape Ethiopia’s political discourse and the way the state is viewed over the past four decades, it has led to the 1995 constitution that led to nominal self rule by ethnic based egional states in most parts of the country except the south.  The argument that the proponents of unitarism make was the domination of one group, the “Amhara ruling class”, against all others.  Thus, it is the conviction of the majority of nations that only ethno-linguistic political characterization can guarantee the equality of all nations and nationalities within the country. Despite Amhara being referred to as “empire builders,” “oppressors,” or both, except the elites, the people have benefited little from the empire, and this extends only to cultural matters (Markakis, Citation2005)9. In reality, the northern region and south of the country were marginalized, were  victims of underdevelopment, and struck by famine by the end of the imperial government. Although  the oppressed Amhara have are not considered as foes, Amhara intellectuals should carry the blame for propagating hateful narratives on nations and nationalities.

The fall of the military regime in 1991

Beginning in 1991, Ethiopia shifted from a centralist state into a constitutionally entrenched ethnic-based multinational federal state (Dereje, Citation2013)10. The then-ruling EPRDF claimed to be the successor of the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) and adopted a unique federal arrangement. “New frontiers in Ethiopian politics” appeared in which ethnic groups became building blocks in the Ethiopian polity (Andreas, Citation2003)11. The year 1991 marked not a mere regime change; it was a turning point at which the Ethiopian state was fundamentally restructured (Dereje, Citation2013)12.  

While the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (commonly known by its Amharic acronym (MEISON) took the class struggle under the Pan-Ethiopian umbrella, the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) choose the national liberation struggle as their prior mission (Merara, Citation2006)13. After the class-based parties were wiped out by the military group, Dergue, the ethno-nationalist movements had gained momentum that dominated the political climate of the country and took power by overthrowing the military regime. The new political system that began in 1991 was thus antithetical to the past regimes. The government began to encourage ethnic mobilization and ethnic-based self-government based on the Soviet federal model.  Many states embrace federal arrangements for the sake of maintaining territorial integrity and managing intrastate conflicts through the accommodation of diversity. This was the major factor for the adoption of post-Cold War federal arrangements (Choudhry & Hume, Citation2011; McGarry & O’Leary, Citation2009)14. Some African states adopted federalism and devolution in their post-conflict situations, among them South Africa (1995), Ethiopia (1995), Sudan (2005), Kenya (2010), South Sudan (2011), and Somalia (2012). The hallmark of post-conflict federations is the drawing of internal borders that aim to ensure territorial autonomy to those ethnic minorities which constitute a majority in a region. The division of powers between different levels of government is designed to ensure that no national group is left out and has sufficient powers to protect itself from economic and political disadvantages. However, this is not always the case when it comes to practice. In some federations like Ethiopia, the design has been working as a fragile experiment (Kymlicka, Citation2006)15. Steytler and de Visser (Citation2015)16 also designated the African federations as “fragile federations” to signify the federal arrangements designed to solve the fragility of the state are themselves fragile.

The ethno-nationalist group, the TPLF prevailed in the armed struggle against the Dergue, established an ethno-nationalist coalition, EPRDF, and seized central power in 1991. EPRDF claims to be the main successor of the Ethiopian Student Movement, advocating the rights of nationalities to self-determination up to and including secession, and adopted federalism in which ethnicity is an organizing principle of the polity. The primary reason for adopting federalism was the need to respond to the “national question” that various ethno-nationalist groups demand self-determination (Assefa & Zemelak, Citation 2018)17. However, after three decades of experimentation with multination federalism, the “national question” endures as many groups are still seeking recognition, self-government, and political participation. The number of ethnic nationalists pursuing armed struggle against the EPRDF regime is not much less than during the Dergue regime. This was mainly because EPRDF and its successor prosperity party violated the constitution and the rights of nations to a full degree of self rule. We know or heard of abuse of power and Coercive control of the state to limit their victim from seeking his rights. The perpetrators work to isolate and intimidate the victim by creating “perceptions”.  Amhara intellectual’s succeed by isolating TPLF, OLF the victims from others. This gave the perpetrators immense power and control. Such a dangerous ploy, where the pattern of a behavior is used by Amhara intellectuals to frighten, threaten, and oppress, which is done through, isolating from the support group, denying freedom and autonomy, lying and gaslighting, name calling, undermining their culture and language and making threatening and accusations. The Amhara intellectuals used dehumanizing rhetoric through continuous propaganda by deploying multimedia outlets calling for violence. They made dehumanizing language part and parcel of their political and cultural discourse.

Ethiopia adopted a federal government arrangement in the early 1990s under the defunct EPRDF regime on an ethno-linguistic basis to decentralize the Amhara-dominated highly centralized structures of imperial Ethiopia. By attributing the failure of the ruling regime to ethnic federalism, the Amhara elites want to score two goals: to take back the Menelik palace and demolish the self-determination of nations granted by the 1995 constitution, at least in theory. They currently refer to this arrangement as tribal politics (ye-gosa politika) and a linguistic-based division (Zeregnoch, gotengnoch, Bekuankua kefafelun). Indeed, it is difficult for ordinary individuals to disentangle the socio-economic and political failures of EPRDF from the so-called “discontents” of ethnic federalism.

 However, this is not due to the failure of the structure per se but rather to the regime’s unwillingness to implement constitutionally mandated rights of nations. In their advocacy for a return to the pre-1991 centralized state structure, these elites often criticize ethnic federalism for weakening the Ethiopian identity. Whenever tribal clashes occur – including instances where the conflicting tribes share the same ethnicity – the Amhara elite deliberately blame ethnic federalism to mislead the public and whip up public opinion against the federal structure. In this context, they try to use public grievances toward the regime for their disguised agenda of reclaiming ‘one Ethiopia.” In addition, since they cannot dismantle multinational federalism alone, the Amhara elites hope to ride on public grievance both to abolish multinational federalism and overthrow the regime. However, they seem not to comprehend that such a misguided strategy risks further balkanization of the country, not to mention it’s too weak a strategy to be taken as an alternative to the former EPRDF regime.

Historical circumstances

The current geo-political boundary of Ethiopia was formed roughly about a century ago when King Menelik II of Abyssinia conquered the hitherto independent states and kingdoms to the south and southeast of its territory. While his war of conquest was one of the bloodiest in the country’s history, understanding how the right to self-determination of nations came about and why it is vital to the territorial integrity of the empire requires a closer analysis of the post-war period. After the forceful incorporation of southern nations into Abyssinia, Menelik and his successors designed a strategy to preserve the empire intact. At the heart of this strategy was a plan to undermine the languages, cultural heritages, and economies of conquered nations. They established a feudal system whereby the natives were required to pay at least a quarter of their hard-earned produce to landlords. In other cases, the natives were evicted to free up land for settlement of people from northern chiefdoms. Such mass evictions over a protracted period particularly targeted the Oromo. For example, until the 1940s and 50s, many Oromo clans from Shawa were forced to flee their original homeland and relocate to the southeastern parts of Oromia in search of farmland. Besides economic exploitations, the feudal state also conducted extensive campaigns to exterminate native people’s cultural heritages, religious institutions, and languages. In some places, the effects were so expansive that people concealed their innate identity and changed names to assimilate.

The feudal system was abolished in 1974 reform. While it ameliorated the sufferings of the masses to some extent, the extractive state structures were left untouched by the reform. For example, given their differential access to educational opportunities and the enabling imperial structures, the feudal Amhara rulers continued their dominance of the country’s politics and economy. The  limited reforms did not allow for the self-determination of nations, either. For example, until the 1990s, attempts to transform Afan Oromo into a written language were repeatedly thwarted. Those who tried to devise an Oromo writing script were targeted and killed. The awakening of oppressed nations and nationalities with access to education posed a grave danger to the status quo.  Subsequently, the brutal economic, cultural, and political oppression gave birth to dozens of ethnic-based liberation fronts. In the later parts of the 1980s, these forces aligned to squash the military and political power of the Amhara-based rule. In 1991, they drafted a transitional constitution that became an antidote to the country’s most fundamental problems through the right to self-determination. In theory, the ethnic self-rule freed all nations from the century-old economic, cultural, and political domination by the Amhara ruling class. Moreover, it became a shield for endangered languages, cultural heritages, and identities from the inertia of the country’s institutionalized assimilationist policies. It allowed the nations to manage their land and other resources. In this context, the relevance and legitimacy of the right to national self-determination in other countries such as India, Canada, and South Africa, was accompanied by ‘affirmative actions’ of one kind or another for historically marginalized groups. Ethiopia’s 1974 revolution was anti-imperialism (to dismantle Amhara culture and language imperialism) and anti-bureaucratic capital.  But did not dismantle the imperial bureaucracy that Amhara intellectuals hung onto and harassed minorities till today.

In the 1990s reform, instead of establishing a truly decentralized and inclusive governance structure, the ruling Tigrean elite, TPLF, imposed its prototype of extractive political and economic institutions using their comparative military advantage. It replaced forces that fought for the self-determination of other nations with quack organizations made up of incompetent, craven, self-seeking, and less educated individuals from each of these nations. These individuals were used as representatives of diverse groups for international propaganda consumption. Nevertheless, the constitutional reform removed restrictions on the use of own language for administrative and educational purposes, and the right to preserve local culture, historical heritages, and identity.

The resurgence of unitarism since the failed democratic transition in 2018

TPLF’s opportunistic behavior and the inability of oppressed nations to compel the regime to respect hard-earned constitutional rights are now giving the Amhara elite a return to their outdated model of campaign for power. They attack self-determination while ironically accusing TPLF of hijacking the victories of the oppressed people in pursuit of its economic exploitations and political domination. Briefly, one may presume that Amhara’s deep-rooted scorn for TPLF is intertwined with that of self-determination and their inability to retake the state power.  First, had the problem been the partially implemented self-determination, such a sentiment would have been shared by other ethnic groups.  Amhara elites lamented and tried to bring other nations and nationalities to their side that the TPLF failed to respect the rights of individuals and nations, and that it ‘divided’ the country along linguistic boundaries which they used as the stepping stone for power. They also argue that the current structure limits the rights of Amharic-speaking people to move around the country in search of better opportunities.

They argue that ethnic federalism undermined the mobility and thereby economic benefits of Amharic-speaking groups. This could well be one of the downsides of ethnic federalism, but we don’t hear Oromos, Sidamas, Somalis, Tigrayans, and other ethnic groups complaining about this. One wonders if a return to a “one language, one nation” unitarist  policy is the best way out as often suggested by these groups. So why is it only the Amhara’s complaining? It is simply because they cannot afford to be equal. In the pre-1991 era, Amharic was the only official language in every corner of the country. As a result, Amhara children had no problem getting admission to schools. Upon graduating, they had no constraints in moving around the country to seek better job opportunities. The same was true for well-connected Amharic-speaking business owners. They could open a shop or restaurant in Jijiga or Nekemte without having to speak the local language. The burden of learning the language was transferred from the businessman offering the services to residents who sought those services. In other words, the locals had to learn Amharic to do business with them in their homeland. In those days, without speaking Amharic an individual from Sidama, the Somali or Oromia region, who had no access to schooling, could not even be hired as a driver, storekeeper, or gardener in any government ininstitution

The 1991 reform flipped the odds by putting an end to Amhara’s privileged status at the expense of three-quarters of the country’s population. For those who had been favored for so long, the leveling of the field may seem unfair. But one reality must sink. A return to an Ethiopia where Amhara’s are once again the overlords is gone forever. 

These Amhara groups don’t realize that their supposed unity agenda has adverse effects on the very virtues they vow to protect. The Amhara politicians’ demagoguery is filling Amharic-speaking innocent youth with illusions and empty hopes that everything that came with TPLF will go with it – soon. As a result, instead of adjusting to the changes in the system, most Amharic-speaking groups line up behind their politicians to abolish the system. Many are running into similar problems. But instead of hoping against hope for a return to ‘united’ Ethiopia with Amharic as the only official language, Amharic-speaking individuals residing in the south should consider adjusting themselves to this irreversible reality.

Now, two opposing political narratives are dwarfing the struggle for justice and freedom in Ethiopia. While those who advance the ‘united Ethiopia’ political paradigm are hoping to undo the country’s ethnic federalism, their opponents are struggling to consolidate the gains that came with such structural changes. Had it not been for their amnesia, there are several lessons the Amharic-speaking elite could learn from the changes of the last three decades. Eritrea went while a loose confederation could have easily been pursued. And they blame TPLF for making the country landlocked. Continued attempts to scoff at the national self-determination of ethnicities will only replicate this mistake. The Amhara elites have only themselves to blame for the current misery of poor Amhara. It will be worse if they do not adjust themselves to the current political dispensation of multi-national federalism and join federalist forces to fight and remove the most brutal regime of “prosperity party”.

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